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Our goal is to clarify the issues being addressed and the critical distinctions that need to be made. We will attempt to consider the entire territory over which the discussion of mapping arises, but no doubt we will miss some of the critical distinctions and issues.
We have divided the paper into three main sections. The first section distinguishes the different kinds of entities that are related by analogy and similarity mappings, and some of their more salient properties. The second section discusses the different contexts or tasks that give rise to mappings. The third section catalogues * the set of issues we have identified in the literature, and identifies some of the different solutions prQposed or possible for each issue.
In a concluding section we briefly discuss the implications of this framework for research.
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WHAT IS MAPPED
The hypothesis we offer is that there are three fundamentally different kinds of entities that are mapped. systems, concepts, and properties and that all the other kinds of mappings discussed in the literature are variations on one of the three System Mapping. The mapping from the solar system to the atom that Gentner (Gentner, 1983 discusses is the classic example of a system mapping. In a system mapping it is critical to determine two types of mappings (Gentner, this volume) I . Which components (i.e., concepts) in the source domain are mapped into 2.-which components in the target domain 2. Which properties of each component (including relations between components) in the source domain are mapped into which properties in the -";.
target domain.
In the solar system/atom analogy, one first has to decide what components map or to decide how likely Linda is to be a feminist bank teller (Tversky and Kahneman. 1980, Smith & Osherson, this volume) requires only a mapping across the properties of two concepts. There is no decomposition into components, as there is with a system mapping So, in the case of Linda in Smith and Osherson's (this volume) account, you consider the properties of salary, education, and politics in the mapping process.
comparing Linda and feminist bank tellers with respect to these properties * Property mapping The simplest kind of mapping specifies a particular property of two concepts for comparison, as when one judges whether an object 3 inches in diameter is more similar to a quarter or a pizza (Rips. this volume) (This example is actually a double mapping, discussed later under three-element comparisons, between O. a 3 inch object and a quarter, and between a 3 inch object and a pizza -system and concept mappings can also involve double mappings) Property mappings differ from concept mappings in that the concepts are compared with respect to a particular property rather than with respect to many properties
The critical distinction between these three kinds of mappings is that the system "2 mappings involve component (or object) mappings as well as property mappings, that concept mappings involve multiple property mapping., and that property mappings involve individual properties of two concepts. The distinction between system and concept mappings is not entirely straightforward. For example, one elementary text we studied (Collins, Gentner, and Rubin, 1981) explained the composition of the earth by analogy to a peach There is the crust which is analogous to the skin, the mantle i-.analogous to the fruit, and the core analogous to the pit. This may appear to be a concept mapping, since it is a comparison of the properties of two concepts. But in fact it is a system mapping, since it requires first decomposing the earth and peach into their components (i.e., the three layers), and then comparing the properties of each pair of components (e.g., the skin and crust are both very thin), and their relations to each other Thus the distinction between a system mapping and a concept mapping rests upon whether there is a two-stage process of first mapping an * organized set of components and then the properties of each component (i e., a system mapping) or a single-stage process of mapping properties (i.e., a concept mapping)
To give a second example of a system mapping that may be difficult to recognize.
one might hypothesize (Collins and Michalski, 1987 ) that a bird's pitch depends on the length of the bird s neck, which is why ducks quack and geese honk, and more generally why small birds sing and big birds squawk (Malt and Smith, 1984) This hypothesis might be generated by analogy to the fact that human pitch (e.g children vs adult voices) depends on the length of the windpipe. To make the inference about birds by analogy to humans requires mapping windpipe length onto neck length, and . human pitch onto bird pitch. Because the analogy involves both a mapping between -their components (e g windpipes and neck) and a mapping of some of their components properties (relative length). it is a system mapping. In this case the property mapped (e.g., "pitch is inversely related to length") is a relational property in Gentner's (this volume) terms or a mutual dependency in Collins and Michalski s (Collins and Michalski, 1987) terms.
There are a number of other kinds of mappings discussed in the literature which we think are special cases of these three kinds of mappings We will briefly describe each. (Gentner and Landers, 1985) and Ross (this volume) have studied mappings between stories. These again are simply system mappings, where it is necessary first to map the characters or objects from one story to the other and then the relations or events between these entities. I There are undoubtedly other kinds of mappings that are made. but we think they will all be variations of the three kinds of mappings we have identified 4 p% I. (Tversky, 1977, Rips, this volume, Smith & Osherson, this volume, Barsalou, this volume) Smith and Osherson (this volume) and Collins and Michalski (Collins and Michalski, 1987) argue that similarity judgments affects the certainty of many inferences people make. 0 Similarity judgments obviously can apply to pairs of systems, concepts, or properties.
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CONTEXTS IN
--2. Typicality judgments. Typicality has been studied in psychology since Rosch (Rosch, 1975) , and plays much the same kind of role in plausible reasoning * as similarity (Collins and Michalski. 1987) . Rips (this volume) has shown convincingly that typicality and similarity judgment are not always made in -.
the same way, so they must be distinguished in any theory Like similarity.
'-"-p typicality applies to pairs of systems, concepts, or properties 3 Categorization judgments Rips (this volume) discusses the similarity theory of categorization, which he rejects
In any case, categorization requires a comparison between properties of two entities, the thing to be categorized and the category.
Categorization only applies to systems and concepts, not to single properties of concepts, except when they are treated as concepts in their own right 4
Identity judgments. Linda Smith (this volume) raises the issue of making identity judgments between entities -that is comparing whether all their properties are the same.
Of course, no two entities are ever exactly the same (e g. her examples of identical elements are not quite the same darkness or shape), so it is necessary to learn what degree of variability of a property can be called the same Identity judgements therefore depend on context.
Overlap judgments.
None of the papers in this volume mention overlap judgments (e.g. whether therapists are psychiatrists), but logically if one includes categorization and identity judgments, then overlap and difference judgments must also be included. Evaluating a "some" statement (e g. "Some women are doctors") requires making an overlap judgment (Meyer, 1970) .
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Difference judgments The question of whether two entities are different (e g. "Are whales fish?") also involves a comparison of properties Like categorization, identity, and overlap judgments, difference judgments are contextually defined For example, whales and fish are different, but both are anima's and can be treated as the same in some contexts, such as grouping things as plants and animals.
I
The last four of these judgments. categorization, identity, overlap, and difference correspond to the four possible relations between two circles in Venn diagrams, as shown in Figure 1 .
B. Mappings
The other type of task that is referred to frequently in the literature is one of mapping properties, components, or both from the source domain to the target domain 
ISSUES FOR A THEORY OF MAPPING
There are a number of issues running through the papers in this volume and the literature more generally In part they reflect the set of subprocesses outlined by Gentner (this volume), but they have wider scope Our attempt here is simply to delineate the set of issues as best we can, and to discuss possible resolutions to them. We start with the most microscopic issues and work up to the more macroscopic issues.
How are individual properties compared?
Potentially there are two kinds of properties that a theory must take into account. discrete properties (e g. male or female) and continuous properties (e.g. size). Tversky and Gati (Tversky and Gati. 1982 ) have shown how it is possible to treat all continuous properties as if they were discrete. Another possibility is to * treat all discrete properties as continuous (a person is on a continuum of male/female and most people fall near one or the other ends of the continuum).
Rips (this volume) addresses the question of how continuous properties are compared for different kinds of three-element comparisons, similarity, typicality, and categorization judgments, which he finds are judged differently. His results suggest that categorization judgments are based on the relative height of the distributione. g a three inch object is more likely a pizza than a quarter, because the distribution of pizzas is higher at that point. His results for similarity judgments suggest both height of the distribution and distance from the mean (or mode) come into play Typicality judgments appear to fall in between categorization and similarity.
as if some subjects treat them like categorization judgments and others like similarity * judgments (or perhaps they are combination judgments)
There are many possible functions for computing any of these judgments for example, similarity might be based on the relative distance between modes of the distribution compared, typicality judgments might be simply similarity judgments between a concept and its superconcept, as Smith & Osherson (this volume) assume Rumelhart's (this volume) theory probably makes a prediction as to which of these functions will best fit the data, but he is not explicit on this point Most of the other theories take no stand on this issue
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How are judgments from different properties combined?
Tversky (Tverskv, 1977) proposes a combining function for similarity judgments. as Ross (this volume) has found in his studies.
What governs which properties are transferred?
This is the central argument animating most of the discussion in the analogy literature. We will briefly delineate the different positions Ortony (Ortony, 1979) advocates the position that salience imbalance governs transfer that is, those properties are transferred that are important in the source domain but not important in the target domain. For example, Sam is a hippopotamus transfers fatness, since that is a typical property of hippos, but not of people
Gentner (Gentner, 1983) proposes a syntactic theory that states that, in analogies, relational properties are transferred but attributes (i-e non-relational properties) are left behind. Furthermore, according to her systematicity principle.
.-" relational properties that are a part of a system of relations (e g. the large mass of the sun attracts the planets into orbiting around it) are more likely to be mapped across Holyoak and Thagard (this volume), Johnson-Laird (this volume), Carbonell (Carbonell, 1986) , and Burstein (Burstein, 1986) , while there are differences in their views, take a position on mapping that appears somewhat different from Gentner.
Their position is that a system (or schema) of properties is mapped over, as Gentner
proposes, but with two differences. (1) attributes will be mapped if they are part of
the system, and (2) the major problem is to decide which system to map over For
K-
example, if the analogy was made between the solar system and a person tanning themself under a sun lamp, the properties mapped would have to do with the heat being transmitted, the person rotating to cover all sides, the yellow color of the lamp.
etc.
It turns out that the latter criticism may be handled by the structure mapping engine (Falkenhainer et al., 1986, Gentner, this volume) that was built recently to embody the Gentner theory. This system compares repesentations of two domains to decide which relations fit into a connected system that can be mapped into the target domain. Because it is effectively comparing all possible sets of relations between the objects considered, it is to some degree automaticallv chosing a "best system' to map However, some pragmatic, contextual selection mechanisms will almost certainly be required as well. This is particularly true during learning, when people usually do not know enough about the target domain to pick out corresponding systems simply by matching (Burstein. 1986 ).
An important test of any of these computer models (Burstein, 1986, Carbonell. 1986, Gentner, this volume. Holyoak and Thagard, this volume) is whether they can This issue is raised by Burstein (Burstein, 1985 (Burstein, , 1986 (Burstein, . 1987 . Spiro (this volume) and Collins and Gentner (Collins and Gentner, 1983) . In Burstein's work, students were learning to program and were forced to combine the mappings of systems like
puttings things in boxes and the the interpretation of arithmetic equalities in forming a mental model to understand computer statements like A=B+I Collins and Gentner (Collins and Gentner, 1983, 1987) describe how subjects combined different analogies (e g billiard-ball analogy, a rocketship analogy, a crowded-room analogy) in understanding evaporation processes. It is clear that people frequently construct their understandings of systems by multiple mappings, and so theories will have to specify how conflicts are resolved about what properties to map from each analcgy.
and whether, in fact, some form of conceptual combination is required to merge related properties mapped from several different sources In Bursteins model conflicts between mappings are usually resolved by reasoning from specific examples in
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the target domain that cause one or another analogical mapping to fall However, the hypotheses that are eventually selected must still be integrated with what had been mapped previously or was otherwise known about the target domain (Burstein, 19871f Burstein (Burstein. 1985) and Collins and Gentner (Collins and Gentner, 1983 ) also raise the issue of vertical integration of mental models Analogies do not always map onto the same level of description of a target system. In such cases, one cannot directly merge analogs Instead, the mapped structures must be maintained distinctly, and rules of correspondence formed between the different views or levels of abstraction described by the different analogical models.
How are mappings refined?
After a mapping is made, some properties carried over into the target domain will not apply. How are the correct properties identified and replaced? Both Burstein (Burstein. 1986) students an analogy or not, they are going to make an analogy to some mechanism .-. they already understand. The continuum from remembering, to reminding, to analogy * that Rumelhart (this volume) describes is operating here Subjects will pull in the mechanism they know about that matches most closely By giving students an explicit analogy, you then accomplish two things (a) you make sure they impute the best matching mechanism, and (b) you know what wrong inferences they are likely to draw * .so that you can try to counter them as you explain the mechanism .9
CONCLUSION
Most researchers are working in a little corner of this framework, which is fine One use of the framework is to help them see what the rest of the territory looks like in order to help them extend their theory to cover the whole territory By trying to extend their theory in this way, it puts additional constraints on theory construction, which will help researchers refine their theories. Furthermore, as theories are extended to cover the whole domain, they will bump up against other theories in more ways which will lead to fruitful controversies and issues to be settled empirically Figure 2 The structure of different comparisons of concepts.
